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Abstract•: This paper analyzes the wage returns from internal migration for recent graduates in 
Italy. We employ a switching regression model that accounts for the endogeneity of the individual’s 
choice to relocate to get a job after graduation: the omission of this selection decision can lead to 
biased estimates, as there is potential correlation between earnings and unobserved traits exerting an 
influence on the decision to migrate. The empirical results sustain the appropriateness of the 
estimation technique and show that there is a significant pay gap between migrants and non-
migrants; migrants seem to be positively selected and the migration premium is downward biased 
through OLS estimates. The endogeneity of migration shows up both as a negative intercept effect 
and as a positive slope effect, the second being larger then the first: bad knowledge of the local 
labor market and financial constraints lead migrants to accept a low basic wage but, due to relevant 
returns to their characteristics, they finally obtain an higher wage then the others. 
Key words: internal relocation; endogeneity; pay gap; migration premium 
JEL codes: J31, J61, R23 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last few decades internal migration from the Southern regions to the regions of Centre-
North significantly increased in Italy. This fact regarded particularly young individuals with a high 
level of education, with a growing relevance starting from 1996 (Piras and Melis, 2007). In this 
paper we analyse the difference in earnings between internal migrants and non-migrants in the 
Italian young graduates. The attention is focused on recent graduates for several reasons: they are 
young and they have a high level of education; migration frequently occurs at the end of a period in 
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investment in human capital (Greenwood, 1975); migration is more likely to occur in the early stage 
of working life, when the family commitments are less frequent, in order to develop skills and 
gather experience.  
In this work, we try to correct for the possible selection bias arising from the individuals’ decisions 
to relocate to work. These decisions may lead to a problem of endogeneity bias. The concept that 
internal migration status may be endogenous has been well established in literature (see, for 
instance, Dostie and Leger, 2009, Gabriel et al., 1995, Borjas et al., 1992a). Migrants are a 
particular group with tastes, motivations and unobserved traits that somehow differentiate them 
from non- migrants. This fact has relevant implications on the estimation of the earning equation as 
there is potential correlation between earnings and unobserved individual elements exerting an 
influence on the decision to migrate. It is less clear if migrants are positively selected (Chiswick’s 
hypothesis: migrants are “more able and more highly motivated” than natives (Chiswick 1978, p. 
900)) or negatively selected (Borjas’ Hypothesis: “migrants tend to come from the lower tail of the 
home country’s income distribution” (Borjas 1987, p. 534)) from their region of origin.  
Once corrected the earning equation for the possible selection bias, we try to estimate the unbiased 
migration premium.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows: section 2 outlines the model; section 3 describes the data 
and the variables employed in the empirical analysis; section 4 presents the results on the migration 
and the earning equations; section 5 estimates the migration premium; Section 6 concludes.  
2. The model 
As pointed out in the introduction, selectivity can arise when the role of the decision process is 
ignored in estimating the earning equations. The decision that need to be explicitly modeled and 
included in the estimation process of the earning equation is if the graduate opts to relocate after 
graduation to seek employment. There are two possible outcomes: either the graduate gets a job in 
the same region of his/her university or the graduate moves away to work.  
Let iR*  be the latent variable indicating the indirect utility of moving away to get a job for 
individual i. This can be modeled as: 
iiiR εα +Ζ= '*         (1) 
where Z is a vector of explanatory variables,α  is a vector of parameters to be estimated and ε  is a 
random term.  
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The individual i chooses to relocate to work if 0* >iR  and does not relocate to work if 0* ≤iR . 
The observed binary variable, iR , takes the value 1 if the graduate relocates to work ( 0
* >iR ) and 
0 if the graduate does not relocate to work ( 0* ≤iR ). 
To appropriately account for the potential selectivity bias due to endogenous migration decision we 
follow the two-steps approach adopted by Heckman (1979) and we interpret the selection bias as an 
omitted variable bias. Thus, we calculate from the previous model (1), estimated through a probit, a 
selection term ( iλ ) to be added as a new regressor in the earning equation; this term corrects for the 
possible endogeneity bias originating from the choice to migrate. If iλ  is not included in the 
equation, the estimates of the coefficients may be biased: indeed, the uncorrected OLS estimate 
does not take in account the covariation between the explanatory variables and the selectivity 
variable iλ . The intuition is that iλ  accounts for the influence of the decision process on the 
dependent variable, that is a conditional hourly earning. The selection term is defined as: 
)'(
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αφλ
i
i
i ΖΦ
Ζ= , if the individual relocates (r=1) 
and 
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i
i ΖΦ−
Ζ−= , if the individual does not relocate (r=0),  
where (.)φ  and (.)Φ  denote the density and the cumulative normal distribution functions of the 
standard normal. 
The earning equation is:  
rirrirriri XY μγλβ ++= 'ln   ri∈ , 1,0=r     (2) 
where Y is the net hourly labor income; X is a vector of explanatory variables that are thought to 
determine earnings; β and γ are parameters to be estimated; andμ  is a random term. 
The subscript r in equation (2) indicates that we estimate separate earning equations for migrants 
and non-migrants, and hence that we adopt an endogenous switching regression model. According 
to this model, the migration effect does not show up as a dummy variable but rather in the fact that 
the constant term and the coefficients may differ from the migrating to the non-migrating group. 
The difference in the betas shows how the returns to the characteristics vary by migration status. 
Thus, this model allows a full set of interactions between migrant status and the explanatory 
variables. The switching regression model also allows to disentangle the pay gap between migrants 
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and non-migrants in different components through the use of a modified version of the original 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973). 
For a better identification of the estimation problems discussed above we should utilize in the 
selection probit valid instruments, i.e. variables that significantly influence the migration choice but 
can be legitimately excluded from the wage equation conditional on the employed explanatory 
variables. This study includes in the selection migration equation the “internal relocation rate” as an 
identifying variable that determines individuals’ choice of relocating but has no effect on their 
earning1. The hypothesis is that the propensity of people to migrate from one place is also a function 
of the amount of people from that place who have previously migrated (Greenwood, 1969, 1972), 
the reason being that information flows from former migrants encourage current migration. This 
argument is also consistent with the key role exerted by social networks in reducing the risks and 
the costs of migration (Deléchat, 2001; Zhao, 1993): migrant network may supply to potential 
migrants a great range of information and advice on job opportunities, may lower psychological 
costs by offering emotional support to migrants in the new residence area, and may grant migrants 
initial housing and logistic support. A number of studies have shown the positive effect exerted by 
migrant networks on migration (see, for instance, Massey et al., 1993; Banerjee, 1984). The 
relocation rate is potentially a good instrument as it is likely to have an important impact on the 
decision to relocate but it is unlikely to be correlated with earnings. Furthermore, following the 
approach of Audas and Dolton (1999), we also include labor market conditions, proxied by the 
gross domestic product per capita in the university region (we employed the average value from 
2004, year of graduation, to 2007, year of analysis), to identify the decision to emigrate2. You may 
note that this variable considers the overall economic situation of a given region, and consequently 
even considers the employment situation and the labour earnings: employment prospects are 
expected to play a significant role in explaining out-migration as people in areas with bad 
employment situation are more likely to show a higher probability of migrating relative to those in 
areas with better situation; moreover, one would expect migration to occur from low to high-income 
regions.  
 
                                                 
1 The relocation rate is here defined as the ratio between the yearly number of migrants from a region to another Italian 
region and the regional population at 1 January of the year (‰) . We calculated the average regional rate from 1995 (the 
first available year in the ISTAT website) to 2007. The sources for this and for the next regional information are always 
from ISTAT. 
2 Robinson and Tomes (1982) employ marital status and family size as identifying variables. Our migration model does 
not comprise these variables as we do not know whether an individual got married and/or had a child before or after 
migrating. 
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3. Data and variables 
This study uses data from a survey carried out by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 
in 2007 representative of individuals who graduated from all Italian universities in 2004 
(Inserimento professionale dei laureati3). The survey asks questions on previous educational 
attainment, degree results, employment status, as well as a range of personal and family attributes. 
These data make it possible to observe each individual’s region of residence4 at two distinct points 
in time: at the time of graduation and three years after completing university. Hence, migration is 
identified by inter-regional migration5.  
First, we restrict the sample to the working graduates with a continuous job (i.e. not seasonal or 
occasional); the sample is further restricted by excluding those individuals who started their current 
job before graduation: we are interested in the young graduates stably entering the labor market. 
Moreover, we have to exclude individuals who attended university outside their region of origin6: 
the survey does not explicitly reports the region of origin but only the previous information (yes or 
no) and the university (and consequently the university region). This is a very important data 
limitation: in such way we can obtain the region of origin and we can avoid the risk of 
misclassification for the source region7, but we also exclude individuals who attended university 
outside their region and decided to work in the university region or to relocate in a third region (or 
to go back in the source region) after the degree. This is an unsolvable point that can have a (not 
estimable) impact on our results; consequently, our conclusions only apply to the considered 
sample. Following the removal of these observations and of individuals with missing variables of 
interest, we have a dataset with 16,242 graduates. Individuals are classified as migrants if the region 
of residence at university differs from the region of work three years after their graduation8. Among 
these, 14,571 (89.7% of the sample) did not move to work and 1,671 (10.3% of the sample) 
relocated to get a job.  
In addition to the identifying variables discussed in the previous section, equation (1) includes: 
gender, family background (proxied by parents’ highest education and occupation); subject of study 
and degree classification at university; and dummies indicating short (three years) or long (four/five 
years) degree, if the graduate completed university in the projected time, if he/she reached a 
postgraduate qualification and if the graduate attended an Erasmus project. The migration equation 
                                                 
3 http://www.istat.it/dati/microdati/elenco_file_standard/ 
4 In this work we refer to the residence region as the living region, and not as the legal residence region. 
5 We use the 20 Italian regions (Eurostat Nuts II level). 
6 Either relocating or not. 
7 As pointed out by Yankow (1999), many studies on migration suffer from misclassification bias. 
8 Given their particular condition, we excluded from the analysis the commuter workers, i.e. individuals usually residing 
in the source region but working in another one. In such way we can exactly consider the relocating migrants. 
 7
also comprises a dummy variable recording whether the individual has found his/her current job via 
informal methods. This variable is here considered to operate as a proxy for the strength of social 
connections individuals have within their region of origin. Thus we expect that having found the 
current employment through parents, relatives or friends should lower the probability of relocating. 
Geographical dummies are here considered to capture the remaining university area effects9. 
To estimate the earning equations, following the approach of Borjas et al. (1992b), we employ a 
human capital model that includes human capital and demographic variables: the rationale for this 
specification is that it is preferable not to control for  the characteristics of the individual’s job, that 
in turn are result of the owned human capital and of the migration decision. The only information 
on the job is the part-time dummy, employed to account for the tax progressiveness (i.e., the tax rate 
increases when the taxable base amount increases). The other explanatory variables are the same of 
the probit, except for the instruments: we only add the average labor income in the region of work 
(in 2007), the seniority on the current job10, a dummy indicating previous job experiences and the 
selection term. The geographical dummies now refer to the region of work. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of the net hourly earning. 
We must highlight that the inclusion in both equations of information on degree classification at 
university, short/long degree, completion of university in the projected time, postgraduate 
qualification and Erasmus project can partly capture the heterogeneity of observed individuals; in 
such way we can consider in the estimates factors that simultaneously affect the probability of 
migration and wages and, hence, we can partly attenuate the endogeneity problem. 
You may note that we do not include age in the explanatory variables: due to privacy restrictions, 
this variable is missing in several records. We tried to run the models including age as explanatory 
variable, but it never showed a significant impact on the outcome variable (migration or earning), 
this fact due to the particular sample of young graduates at first degree and with a job obtained after 
the degree. So we decided to exclude this variable and consider in the analysis also the records with 
this variable missing.  
Appendix 1 presents a brief description of the survey and, in table A1, the depictive statistics of the 
employed variables. 
                                                 
9 We use the 5 Italian macro-areas (Eurostat Nuts I level). 
10 This is an approximation because the survey data only reports the starting date of the job. The survey documentation 
(Istat, 2009) states that the interviews were conducted in about four months and that the collection ended in December. 
So we assumed that all the interviews were conducted in December 2007 and obtained the seniority (with a maximum 
error of three months in a range that has a maximum of 47, from January 2004 to December 2007). We preferred to use 
such approximation instead of omitting a so (theoretically) important information. Actually, the empirical evidence 
showed very small differences in the results either including or not including the seniority. 
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4. Empirical results 
Table 1 presents the estimates for the relocation probit11. Males have a greater probability to 
relocate to work. Subject studied at university is found to be an important determinant of the 
likelihood of migrating: graduates in economics or statistics and in architecture or engineering have 
a higher probability of relocating while graduates in political science, in literature, languages, 
psychology or education and in physics, maths, chemistry, biology or pharmacy have a lower 
probability than the others. Individuals with better results in terms of qualification are more likely to 
relocate. Having a postgraduate qualification increases the probability of migrating: one possible 
explanation is that the labor market for individuals with postgraduate qualifications is more national 
in scope in respect of people who only have a lower degree (Schwartz, 1973). Individuals who spent 
some time abroad during their study course (the Erasmus dummy) have a greater probability to 
migrate than the others, because they are more willing to the relocating experience. The dummy 
variable recording whether the individual has found his/her current job via informal methods has the 
expected negative impact on the probability to relocate. Finally, individuals from the richest area of 
the Country, the North-West, are less likely to migrate, while there is no significant impact from 
parents’ information. 
Let us now review the impact of the instruments: in line with the expectations, the coefficient on the 
relocation rate is both significant and positively correlated with the probability of migrating. This 
result clearly suggests that the propensity of people to migrate is affected by the number of 
individuals from their region of origin who have previously migrated. Moreover, the coefficient on 
gdp per capita has the expected negative sign. 
*******TABLE 1********* 
 
The first half of Table 2 presents estimates of the migrants earning equation while the second half 
of the table depicts the results of the non-migrants earning equation12. Let us first discuss the 
selectivity terms: these ones measures the possible bias due to the choice to relocate or not. The 
coefficient is found to be statistically significant in both groups. Thus the empirical results confirm 
the presence of self-selection into migration: ignoring this fact can lead to biased estimates of the 
betas in the OLS. The negative sign of the selection term for both groups indicates an opposite 
                                                 
11 The standard errors presented in this paper are corrected for the clustering of individuals inside the regions (the 
university region for the migration equation and the labour region for the earning equations) to prevent misleading 
results (Moulton, 1990). 
12 Table A2 in Appendix presents the OLS estimates (switching regression as well as pooled regression) without 
correction for selectivity bias.  
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impact of these terms (the selection terms have opposite signs in the groups, as you may note from 
the definition in section 2 and from Table A1).  
Through the use of the estimated coefficients from the unbiased earning equations and the average 
characteristics of individuals in the two groups, we can obtain the contribution of the observables 
and the constant13 (the first term on the right) and of the selection term (the second term on the 
right) on the average net hourly earning (the term on the left).  
−∧∧− += MMMMM XY λγβ
'_
)ln( 
−∧∧− += NNNNN XY λγβ
'_
)ln( 

n the migrant group (subscript M), the selection term impacts negatively on earning, and explain 
about -4.4% of the average labor income, while the observables and the basic earning explain 
104.4% of the average earning. Conversely, in the non-migrant group (subscript N) the selectivity 
contribution is positive but negligible, about 1.2% of the average earning, while the contribution of 
observables and the basic earning explain 98.8% of the average earning. We will return to this point 
in section 5. 
Before discussing the other explanatory variables, we need to check the endogeneity of the 
migration decisions as well as the ‘quality’ and the ’validity’ of our instruments14. First, we 
calculate the Hausman t-test (Hausman, 1978; Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) to check whether 
wages are adequately modelled by the OLS method. Thus we introduce the residuals from the first-
stage regression (using probit) as an explanatory variable in the OLS estimation of the wage 
equation and look at its t-statistic. If the t-test rejects the null hypothesis that the estimated 
coefficient on the residuals is not significantly different from zero, one may conclude that the OLS 
regression technique is not appropriate to estimate the earnings function. This condition was 
satisfied for both groups15. The Hausman test is based on the assumption that the instruments are 
good instruments; consequently, we also evaluate the quality as well as the validity of the 
instruments. Instrumental quality is ensured if there is a strong correlation between the instruments 
and the endogenous variable; to test the joint significance we use the criteria suggested by Bound et 
al. (1995) to check whether there is a weak correlation between the instruments and the endogenous 
explanatory variables, as this would yield inconsistent estimates. The partial R squared and F 
                                                 
13 Unfortunately, we can not disentangle the contribution of the basic earning (i.e. the constant) from the observables: in 
presence of multiple sets of dummy variables, the constant is not invariant to the choices of reference groups. This 
problem does not arises in presence of continuous variables (as the selection term).  
14 Appendix 3 presents the employed tests. 
15 The Hausman test produces a t-statistic of –2.31 and –2.67 in the migrant and in the non-migrant group respectively, 
indicating that the suspected endogenous variable is in fact endogenous to the system. 
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statistic on the excluded instruments in the first-stage regressions (using OLS) indicate that the 
instruments are legitimate16. Finally, the validity is ensured if the instrument can be legitimately 
excluded from the income equation. This assumption is firstly checked through the Sargan test: 
thus, we regressed the residuals from the wage estimations against the set of all exogenous variables 
(instruments and not). The R squared multiplied for the number of observation approximately 
distribute as a Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the 
number of endogenous variables. The test must be insignificant in order for the instruments to be 
well identified. While this assumption is met in the migrant group, it is not met in the non-migrant 
group17. The Sargan test is valid only in case of over-identification, i.e. the number of valid 
instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables. It is possible that in the non migrant 
group we only have one valid instrument; moreover, you may also note that this test is highly 
influenced from the number of observations, that is relevant in the non-migrant group. Thus, we 
also checked the validity through the approach of Dolton and Vignoles (2002): valid instruments 
must be uncorrelated with the error term of the earning equation, and thus they do not affect the 
income conditional on the included explanatory variables. Hence, the residuals from the earning 
estimations are regressed against the instruments, obtaining a R2 approximately equal to 0.0002 in 
the non-migrants’ group and approximately equal to 0.0001 in the migrants’ group. This indicates 
that the instruments do not explain any significant variation in the residual variability and hence are 
valid.  
We discuss the coefficients on the other explanatory variables only briefly. The coefficient on 
gender is statistically significant and has a positive sign in both equations: male workers receive a 
higher income compared with female workers. Subject of study is an important determinant of 
earnings: in both groups, graduates in medicine present the highest earnings, while graduates in 
political science generally earn less then the others. Moreover, migrants graduated in law have a 
higher premium in respect of their non-migrants peers, while the opposite happens for graduates in 
medicine and political science. Higher degree classifications determinate higher earnings, even if 
the coefficients do not reach statistical significance at the conventional levels. Individuals with long 
courses degree earn about 10% more than the others. Both seniority and previous job experiences 
have a positive impact on earnings only among non-migrants. There is a small impact of the family 
background. The dummy recording whether the individual has found his/her current job via 
informal methods has a strong negative impact on earnings, indicating that individuals who use this 
                                                 
16 More precisely, in the migration equation the partial R squared and F statistic on the excluded instruments are 0.100 
and 39.44 respectively, suggesting that the instruments make a relevant jointly contribution in explaining the migration 
decision. 
17 We obtained a Chi-squared of 0.17 in the migrant group and of 8.74 in the non-migrant group.  
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method are probably the ones with the lowest level of skills and determination. Generally, graduates 
working in the North obtain higher incomes, especially among the migrant group. Finally, there is 
the expected positive sign of the average labour income in the non-migrants’ group, while this 
impact is negative in the migrants’ group18. 
*********TABLE 2******** 
 
5. The migration premium: are migrants positively or negatively selected? 
We can now estimate the migration premium for internal relocation. We follow the methodology of 
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) that slightly modify the original Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, and 
decompose the pay gap between migrants and non-migrants into components: 
)()()(lnln ''' NNMMMNMNNMNM XXXYY
−∧−∧∧∧−∧−−−− −+−+−=− λγλγβββ      (3) 
where the dash indicates the average vector of the characteristics, the hat indicates the estimated 
coefficients vectors and the M and N subscripts indicate, respectively, migrants and non-migrants.  
The first term on the right represents the component due to the difference between the average 
characteristics of migrants and non-migrants ("endowment effect"), evaluated at the return rate of 
the non-migrants, identified as the reference group19; the second term shows the part of the gap 
attributable to the different evaluation of the same characteristics between the two groups 
(“coefficients effect”): it utilizes the average characteristics of migrants and the estimated 
coefficients for the two groups. The coefficients effect has often been identified as an 
approximation of the wage discrimination (either positive or negative) in the labor market20. In our 
context, it can be interpreted as the “migration premium”. The third term accounts for the selectivity 
effects21. We insulated these terms (i.e. we did not consider the selectivity terms in the two 
traditional endowment and coefficient effects) as they account for unobservable traits that can be 
different between groups. In other words, the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition implies 
comparing wages between individuals by projecting wage returns for the reference group to the 
characteristics of the other group: the risk is to project returns to non-migrants’ unobservable traits 
                                                 
18 The last result is surely strange; we must highlight that this variable records the overall yearly net labour income, that 
depends on hourly income and on the worked hours, while the dependent variable in the equations is the net hourly 
labour income. 
19 Hence, this term even considers that the percentage of workers in the richest areas of the Country (North and Centre) 
is greatly higher among migrants then among non-migrants. 
20 Some authors prefer to consider it as the unexplained component of the pay gap. 
21 You may note that the conclusions of footnote 13 apply to the decomposition in (3): the overall decomposition and 
the separately estimated endowment and coefficient effects are invariant with respect to the choice of left out reference 
groups (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999), while we could identify the contribution of the selection terms because of the 
continuous nature of this variable. 
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on migrants, where these traits are different; if comparisons is not restricted to individuals with 
comparable characteristics, this fact might lead to misleading conclusions (Barsky et al., 2002). 
The observed pay gap (Tab. 3) is equal to 0.1064, that means an earning gap of about 10.64% in 
favor of migrants. Through the corrected OLS, the endowment effect accounts for +1.48%; the 
coefficient effect (the migration premium) accounts for +20.71%; the differences on the effects of 
the selection terms accounts for -11.55%. Through the not corrected OLS, the values are +0.90% 
for the endowment effect and +9.74% for the migration premium. This implies that the migration 
premium is greatly underestimated through OLS.  
 
*******TABLE 3******** 
 
We can now give an answer to the question: are migrants positively or negatively selected? The use 
of a switching regression model corrected for the endogeneity of migration permits to obtain 
unbiased OLS estimates and to analyze the effects of the migration status both as an intercept effect 
and as a slope effect. The difference in the betas tells how the returns to different attributes vary by 
migration status, and consequently show that migrants are rewarded with “better” slopes, probably 
because they are more motivated and able then their peers, even observable characteristics paribus. 
Thus, the results seem to suggest that migrants are positively selected from their region of origin. 
The relevant estimated returns to characteristics is also coherent with the hypothesis that migrants’ 
self-selection depends on the difference in returns to characteristics. 
Conversely, we interpret the negative impact of the selection terms as a variation in the constant 
term (i.e., a negative reward to the latent trait “migration propensity”). Remembering what already 
said in section 4 (the selection terms impact positively on the non-migrants’ earnings, where explain 
about 1.2% of the average earning, and negatively on the migrants’ earnings, where explain about -
4.4% of the average earning), we can speculate that migrants start from a lower basic earning in 
respect of non-migrants, and this fact arises from three reasons: first, migrants have a bad 
knowledge of the local labor market22; second, when migration is from poorest to richest regions, 
the basic wage that migrants obtain in the new region is almost surely higher then the one they 
could obtain in the region of origin (their reference labor market)23; third, individuals relocated 
before getting the job (i.e., to seek employment) are generally financial constrained and can not be 
selective on the job offered (they are living outside parents’ home without a personal income).  
                                                 
22 They are very recent migrants.  
23 In our database, individuals relocated in a better region in terms of gdp per capita are 88% of migrants. 
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In conclusion, the endogeneity effects of migration on earnings show up both as a negative intercept 
effect and as a positive slope effect, the second being larger then the first: migrants start from a 
lower basic wage because they have a bad knowledge of the local labor market and they are 
financial constrained, but, being positively selected, they obtain relevant returns to their 
characteristics and achieve higher wages then the others. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper analyzed the returns from internal migration among recent graduates in Italy. We 
employed an earning model that accounts for the endogeneity of the choice to relocate to get a job 
after graduation. Four main conclusions come out from the analysis. First, there is a significant pay 
gap between internal migrants and non-migrants (+10.64% in favor of migrants on the net hourly 
labor income). Second, the results sustain the appropriateness of the estimation technique and hence 
suggest that omission of selection decision can lead to biased estimates: in fact, OLS estimates do 
not account for the unobserved elements exerting an influence both on the decision and on earnings. 
Third, the returns to observables (the migration premium) estimated through OLS are likely to be 
biased downward: once we consider the endogeneity of the choice, the migration premium rises 
from +9.74% to +20.71%. Hence, migrants seem to be positively selected on observable traits; this 
conclusion is coherent with the hypothesis that migrants’ self-selection depends on the difference in 
returns to characteristics. Forth, the endogeneity of migration shows up both as a negative intercept 
effect and as a positive slope effect, the second being larger then the first: migrants usually accept a 
lower basic wage (because they do not have a good knowledge of the local market, they generally 
obtain a basic wage higher then the one they could obtain in their region of origin, and they can not 
be selective on the jobs offered) but, due to relevant returns to their characteristics, they finally 
obtain higher wages than the others. 
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Table 1: Probit equation- Decision to relocate to work 
Prameter Estimate S.E. 
Intercept 0.1515 0.2671 
Male 0.0922* 0.0335 
Subject of study (Ref=economics or statistics)   
Literature, languages, psychology or education -0.1613* 0.0505 
Political Science  -0.1842* 0.0647 
Physics, maths, chemistry, biology or pharmacy  -0.1507* 0.0795 
Law -0.0782 0.0681 
Architecture or engineering  -0.0073 0.0586 
Medicine -0.1138 0.0974 
Degree classification (Ref= less then 100)   
100-104 0.0542 0.0445 
105-109 0.1298* 0.0559 
110 and 110 cum laude 0.1306* 0.0480 
Long corse -0.0233 0.0372 
Completed in time 0.0389 0.0434 
Erasmus 0.3319* 0.0539 
Postqualification degree 0.2130* 0.0457 
Geographical area (Ref=North-West)   
North-East 0.2367* 0.0366 
Centre  0.2826* 0.0412 
South  0.2499* 0.1252 
Islands 0.0532 0.1498 
Parents’ occupation (Ref= Manager, entrepreneur or 
prefessional )  
  
High level public servant or has a scientific and highly 
specialized occupation  
0.0157 0.0622 
Other occupations -0.0774 0.0814 
Parents’ degree lower than high school 0.0386 0.0545 
Network to find job -0.3833* 0.1026 
Regional relocation rate (‰) 0.0339* 0.0166 
Regional Gdp per capita (€/1,000) -0.0894* 0.0099 
Observations 16,242 
Log likelihood  -4484.1877 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 10%; standard errors corrected for clustering in the regions. 
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    Table 2: Earning equation- OLS with Selectivity Bias Correction 
 Migrants Non-migrants 
Parameter Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
Intercept 2.7526* 0.2826 1.6076* 0.1337 
Male 0.0635* 0.0254 0.0700* 0.0110 
Subject of study (Ref=economics or statistics)   
Literature, languages, psychology or education 0.0931** 0.0553 0.0674* 0.0251 
Political Science  -0.0963* 0.0394 -0.0405* 0.0153 
Physics, maths, chemistry, biology or pharmacy  0.0603 0.0376 0.0326* 0.0150 
Law 0.0412 0.0586 -0.1110* 0.0318 
Architecture or engineering  0.0272 0.0235 0.0140 0.0137 
Medicine 0.1775* 0.0433 0.2795* 0.0131 
Degree classification (Ref= Less then 100)   
100-104 0.0187 0.0300 0.0068 0.0080 
105-109 0.0174 0.0200 0.0035 0.0116 
110 and 110 cum laude 0.0429 0.0265 0.0205 0.0164 
Long corse 0.1038* 0.0339 0.0967* 0.0076 
Completed in time 0.0302 0.0209 -0.0078 0.0132 
Erasmus 0.0047 0.0265 -0.0297 0.0196 
Postqualification degree -0.0348 0.0398 0.0181 0.0111 
Previous job experience 0.0202 0.0244 0.0308* 0.0076 
Geographical area (Ref=North-West)     
North-East 0.0335 0.0289 -0.0273** 0.0143 
Centre  -0.0820* 0.0225 -0.0344 0.0210 
South  -0.2773* 0.0958 -0.0845* 0.0291 
Islands -0.4666* 0.0788 0.0129 0.0299 
Parents’ occupation (Ref= Manager, entrepreneur or prefessional )    
High level public servant or has a scientific and 
highly specialized occupation  
-0.0111 0.019 -0.0077 0.0106 
Other occupations -0.0383 0.0306 -0.0289** 0.0172 
Parents’ degree lower than high school 0.0119 0.0136 -0.0063 0.0144 
Network to find job -0.1398* 0.0502 -0.0599* 0.0102 
Parttime 0.0220 0.0432 0.1302 0.0185 
Seniority -0.0010 0.0017 0.0013* 0.0003 
Regional average labor income in 2007 (€/1,000) -0.0351* 0.0135 0.0116** 0.0067 
λ -0.0625* 0.0271 -0.1441* 0.0539 
Observations 1,671 14,571 
R-squared 0.1351 0.0956 
       *significant at 5%; ** significant at 10%; standard errors corrected for clustering in the regions. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Pay gap (%), endowment effect, coefficient effect (migration premium) and selectivity effects through Ols 
corrected and not corrected for endogeneity bias  
MODEL Pay gap  (=a+b+c) 
Endowment effect 
(a) 
Coefficient effect  
(Migration premium) 
(b) 
Selection terms effect 
(c) 
Corrected Ols 10.64 1.48 20.71 -11.55 
Not corrected Ols 10.64 0.90 9.74 --- 
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Appendix 1 – Data and variables 
This study uses data from a survey (Inserimento professionale dei laureati) carried out by the Italian 
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) in 2007 and representative of individuals who graduated 
from all Italian universities in 2004, both in long and in short courses. The original sample is 
composed from 20,730 graduates in short courses (sampling rate equal to 22.5%) and 26,570 
graduates in long courses (sampling rate equal to 15.8%). The overall sample size is equal to 47,300 
graduates.  
According to the aims of the paper, the sample is restricted to the graduates who completed 
university in 2004 in their region of origin, in working condition in 2007, with a continuous job 
started after graduation. Following the removal of the observations with missing variables of 
interest, we have a dataset with 16,242 graduates, 4,616 graduated in short courses and 11,626 
graduated in long courses.  
Table A1 reports the depictive statistics (average values) of the employed variables. Variables 
whose values are reported in the column “All” are the ones employed in the migrant equation. 
Variables whose values are reported in the column “Migrants” and “Non-migrants” are the ones 
employed in the earning equations. 
 
Table A1. Depictive statistics – Average values 
Variable 
SAMPLE 
All Migrants Non-migrants 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES    
Migrant status 0.103   
Ln(hourly net earning)  2.098 1.992 
    
EXPLICATIVE VARIABLES    
Male 0.431 0.466 0.427 
Subject of study     
Literature, languages, psychology or education 0.223 0.206 0.225 
Economics or statistics 0.177 0.192 0.175 
Political Science  0.100 0.082 0.102 
Physics, maths, chemistry, biology or pharmacy  0.120 0.117 0.120 
Law 0.073 0.082 0.072 
Architecture or engineering  0.221 0.239 0.219 
Medicine 0.087 0.083 0.088 
Degree classification    
Less then 100 0.280 0.198 0.290 
100-104 0.228 0.213 0.229 
105-109 0.220 0.239 0.218 
110 and 110 cum laude 0.272 0.350 0.263 
Long corse 0.716 0.781 0.708 
Completed in time 0.408 0.368 0.413 
Erasmus 0.079 0.112 0.076 
Postqualification degree 0.243 0.334 0.233 
Previous job experience  0.601 0.578 
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Geographical area of the university    
North-West 0.322   
North-East 0.195   
Centre  0.213   
South  0.186   
Islands 0.084   
Geographical area of the job    
North-West  0.402 0.348 
North-East  0.262 0.206 
Centre   0.287 0.221 
South   0.039 0.149 
Islands  0.009 0.076 
Parents’ profession    
Manager, entrepreneur or prefessional 0.220 0.198 0.223 
High level public servant or has a scientific and highly 
specialized occupation  0.379 0.383 0.374 
Other occupations 0.401 0.419 0.403 
Parents’ degree lower than high school 0.323 0.319 0.324 
Network to find job 0.191 0.098 0.201 
Parttime  0.067 0.161 
Seniority (months)  20.616 23.216 
Regional elocation rate (‰) 5.566   
Regional Gdp per capita (€/1,000) 22.386   
Regional average labor income in 2007 (€/1,000)  18.503 17.735 
λ  1.461 -0.168 
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Appendix 2 Earning equations not corrected for selectivity bias. 
    Table A2: Earning equation- OLS without  Selectivity Bias Correction 
 Migrants Non-migrants All 
 Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
Intercept 2.5584* 0.2402 1.7294* 0.1252 1.7841* 0.1157 
Migrant     0.0947* 0.0239 
Male 0.0672* 0.0250 0.0732* 0.0108 0.0704* 0.0095 
Subject of study (Ref=economics or statistics)     
Literature, languages, 
psychology or education 
0.0905** 0.0549 0.0628* 0.0240 0.0671* 0.0183 
Political Science  -0.1037* 0.0372 -0.0454* 0.0155 -0.0505* 0.0131 
Physics, maths, chemistry, 
biology or pharmacy  
0.0581 0.0363 0.0283* 0.0137 0.0310* 0.0102 
Law 0.0401 0.0582 -0.1132* 0.0314 -0.0911* 0.0232 
Architecture or engineering  0.0288 0.0203 0.0144 0.0139 0.0165 0.0114 
Medicine 0.1953* 0.0420 0.2772* 0.0130 0.2715* 0.0097 
Degree classification (Ref= Less then 100)     
100-104 0.0251 0.0337 0.0088 0.0078 0.0099 0.0077 
105-109 0.0260 0.0186 0.0079 0.0115 0.0101 0.0105 
110 and 110 cum laude 0.0550** 0.0294 0.0253 0.0160 0.0313* 0.0133 
Long corse 0.1190* 0.0325 0.0969* 0.0076 0.1008* 0.0072 
Completed in time 0.0264 0.0217 -0.0070 0.0131 -0.0041 0.0109 
Erasmus 0.0137 0.0276 -0.0180 0.0176 -0.0155 0.0156 
Postqualification degree -0.0235 0.0374 0.0263* 0.0121 0.0207 0.0147 
Previous job experience -0.0245 0.0241 0.0309* 0.0076 0.0223* 0.0069 
Geographical area (Ref=North-West)     
North-East 0.0368 0.0265 -0.0294* 0.0138 -0.0195 0.0120 
Centre  -0.0748* 0.0198 -0.0277 0.0208 -0.0347** 0.0181 
South  -0.2564* 0.0911 -0.0496** 0.0261 -0.0633* 0.0237 
Islands -0.4631* 0.0863 0.0268 0.0304 0.0105 0.0288 
Parents’ occupation (Ref= Manager, entrepreneur or 
prefessional ) 
    
High level public servant or 
has a scientific and highly 
specialized occupation  
-0.0013 0.0169 -0.0067 0.0104 -0.0054 0.0105 
Other occupations -0.0321 0.0290 -0.0314* 0.0174 -0.0301* 0.0153 
Parents’ degree lower than 
high school 
0.0135 0.0142 -0.0052 0.0143 -0.0032 0.0123 
Network to find job -0.1684* 0.0561 -0.0710* 0.0121 -0.0763* 0.0130 
Parttime 0.0214 0.0441 0.1298* 0.0184 0.1244* 0.0167 
Seniority -0.0012 0.0017 0.0013* 0.0003 0.0010* 0.0004 
Regional average labor 
income in 2007 (€/1,000) 
-0.0310* 0.0126 0.0055 0.0063 0.0029 0.0057 
Observations 1,671 14,571 16,242 
R-squared 0.1301 0.0954 0.0973 
       *significant at 5%; ** significant at 10%; standard errors corrected for clustering in the regions. 
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Appendix 3 – Tests on endogeneity of migration and on instrumental quality and validity. 
 
Hausman T-test to check the endogeneity of migration: the residuals of the first stage regression are 
included in the earning equations. If the T-test rejects the null hypothesis migration is endogenous. 
T-test on migrants’ group equal to -2.31, significant at 99% level. 
T-test on non-migrants’ group equal to -2.67, significant at 99% level. 
 
Bound tests to test instrumental quality: partial R2 and F statistic on instruments in the first stage 
regression (through OLS) are used to check if there is strong correlation between instruments and 
the endogenous variable. 
Partial R squared on the excluded instruments in the migrant equation: 0.100 
F statistic on the excluded instruments in the migrant equation: 39.44, significant at 99% level. 
 
Sargan test to test the instrumental validity: the residuals of the wage estimations are regressed 
against the set of all exogenous variables; the R2 multiplied for the number of observations 
approximately distributes as a Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
instruments less the number of endogenous variables. The test must be insignificant to have valid 
instruments.   
Chi-squared in the migrants’ group equal to 0.17. 
Chi-squared in the non-migrants’ group equal to 8.74. 
 
Dolton and Vignoles approach to test the instrumental validity: the residuals of the earning 
estimations are regressed against the instruments to check if the last ones are uncorrelated with the 
error terms. 
R2 in the migrants’ group: approximately equal to 0.0001; 
R2 in the non-migrants’ group: approximately equal to 0.0002. 
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